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Abstract: A central point of debate over environmental policies 
concerns how future costs and benefits should be assessed. The most 
commonly used method for assessing the value of future costs and 
benefits is economic discounting. One often-cited justification for 
discounting is uncertainty. More specifically, it is risk aversion coupled 
with the expectation that future prospects are more risky. In this    
paper I argue that there are at least two reasons for disputing the use of 
risk aversion as a justification for discounting when dealing with long-
term decisions, one technical and one ethical. Firstly, I argue that 
technically, it implies an inconsistency between theory and practice.  
And secondly, I argue that discounting for uncertainty relies on a form 
of individualism which, while reasonable in standard microeconomic 
theory where an agent chooses how to spread her own consumption 
over her own lifetime, is inappropriate in the context of inter-
generational social decisions. 
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Long-term environmental policy decisions, such as those concerning 
climate change and nuclear energy, raise many important scientific, 
social, and economic issues. A central point of debate over such 
decisions concerns how future economic costs and benefits should be 
assessed. The methods chosen to assess future costs and benefits, and 
the justifications we have for choosing such methods have deep social, 
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political and ethical implications (Gardiner 2004, 572; Caney 2009, 163). 
Arguably the most commonly used method for assessing the value of 
future costs and benefits in both scientific and economic models is 
discounting, a cost-benefit analysis tool that decreases future costs   
and benefits by a yearly rate, the discount rate. The discount rate is     
an aggregate of various parameters, each representing a different 
motivation and justification for discounting, and these motivations and 
justifications are each a point of debate amongst experts in the field 
(Stern 2007, 41; Nordhaus 2007, 689; Quiggin 2008, 200). 
One such justification for discounting is uncertainty. The rationale 
for this view is that all things being equal, we are better able to assess 
what the state of affairs will be like tomorrow than next year, and we  
are better able to assess what the state of affairs will be like next year 
than the following year, and so on for any subsequent year. Given this 
increasing uncertainty over time, we are justified in placing greater 
value on present consumption than on future consumption, as present 
consumption is more certain. However, it is not uncertainty in any and 
all of its forms that is used to justify discounting; it is uncertainty over 
the likelihood of hitting the expected value of a project, which is used  
to justify discounting. It is a preference for a guaranteed outcome over a 
gamble that has the same expected value as the guaranteed return,       
or simply risk aversion, which is usually presented as a justification    
for discounting (Smith 2011, 4; Howarth 2009, 24; Brent 1996, 168; 
Department of Infrastructure and Planning 2007, 9). 
I will argue that there are at least two reasons for disputing the 
inclusion of risk aversion in our justifications for discounting when 
dealing with long-term decisions. Firstly, appealing to uncertainty and 
risk aversion as a justification for discounting is technically problematic 
because it implies an inconsistency between theory and practice.       
This has implications for cost-benefit analysis which have not been 
noted before. Secondly, the premise that we are justified in preferring 
the more certain present to the less certain future is ethically 
problematic as this justification relies on a form of individualism. This 
form of individualism might be reasonable in standard microeconomic 
theory where an agent chooses how to spread her own consumption 
over her own lifetime. However, when faced with long-term 
environmental decisions, one moves from the individual decisions to  
the social decisions and from intra-generational decision to inter-
generational decisions.  
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Unlike discounting in an intra-generational setting, discounting in an 
inter-generational setting presents us with a discontinuity between the 
beneficiaries of the decision (the present generation) and the subsidisers 
of the decision (the future generations). This discontinuity—which has 
played an important role in the ethical discourse concerning climate 
change—challenges the microeconomic rationale for using discounting 
when dealing with uncertainty. Before arguing my case, I will briefly 
discuss discounting, and how uncertainty in the form of risk aversion is 
used to justify discounting. 
 
1. DISCOUNTING AND UNCERTAINTY 
Most, if not all of our economic decisions involve comparing 
commodities. We might compare one commodity at a price against 
another commodity at a price, such as an apple at $1 against a pear at 
$1.05. Or we might compare one commodity against the same 
commodity, but at different points in time; such as an apple at $1 now 
against an apple at 90c next year. In cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 
discounting is a way of assessing the value of consumption—either as 
costs or as benefits—at different points in time. It is a way of assessing 
how much next year’s apple is worth to me relative to today’s apple.    
As part of this paper is concerned with the technical application of 
discounting, let me briefly explain the mechanics of discounting. 
Consider the following pair-wise comparison: 
 
1) $200,000 now and further $100,000 in 10 years time or  
 
2) $280,000 now and nothing further. 
 
Assuming both options cost the same, in order to work out which 
option offers the highest return, we need to assess whether $100,000 in 
10 years time is greater than, less than, or equal in value to $80,000 
now. Working out the Net Present Value (NPV) of $100,000 in 10 years is 
just what discounting does. We can think of discounting as the reverse 
of interest; how much money would I have to invest today at a given 
interest rate r such that in 10 years time I have $100,000? Put in a 
general form, the equation for the net present value of a good NPV(G), 
with future value fv(G) in t years, at discounting rate r is: 
 
NPV(G)=fv(G)/(1+r)t 
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At a discount rate of 2.8% p.a., the rate suggested by the Office       
of Management and Budget, $100,000 in 10 years time has a NPV of 
$75,870 (OMB 2011). Thus option 2) is better, paying $280,000, 
compared to option 1) paying $275,870. But how do we work out the 
discount rate? A common way to arrive at a discount rate is to consider 
the various motivations we have for discount independently, and to 
work out how much discounting each motivation justifies. The amount 
of discounting justified by the various motivations is then aggregate 
into a single rate. These motivations are usually given as impatience or 
pure time preference, economic growth, opportunity cost, and risk    
and uncertainty. 
In this paper, I will only be concerned with how much discounting 
can be justified by uncertainty. More specifically, I will be concerned 
with uncertainty spelled out in terms of risk aversion, as this is a 
common model. For example, Robert Brent, in his textbook on applied 
CBA, explains, “the risk premium is added to the discount rate to 
correct for the uncertainty characteristic of the benefit being in the 
future” (Brent 1996, 168). In regard to long-term environmental 
decisions, such as the climate change debate, Kathryn Smith states that 
one of the roles of η, a parameters of the social discount rate, “is to 
measure relative risk aversion. In a stochastic model, higher η implies 
more disutility from exposure to risk” (Smith 2011, 4). One point to note 
before proceeding is that there has been substantial discussion on 
whether the discount rate should be constant for through time or not.  
In this paper, I will be assuming constant rates as this is the practice 
advocated by the OMB amongst others (OMB 2011). 
 
Risk aversion and risk premiums 
The economic definition of a decision under uncertainty is a decision in 
which the probability of each outcome is known, but in which no single 
outcome is certain (Perloff 2004, 574). According to proponents of 
discounting for uncertainty, uncertainty leads us to discount because we 
prefer more certain returns to less certain returns, and the present is 
more certain than the future. As codified in the expression “a bird in the 
hand is worth two in the bush”, we place greater value on what we know 
we have over what we think we might get.1  
                                                 
1 In fact this preference for the certain option over the uncertain (even if the certain 
option is of lesser value) is the economic definition of risk aversion; see Perloff 2004, 582. 
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Consider the returns of a forestry project and deciding whether to 
harvest now, or in five years, assuming both options have the same 
expected return. We might be quite certain of the current market price 
of the wood and the current harvesting rate, but both of these are liable 
to change over time. Those changes in price and harvesting rate may be 
either to our benefit, or to our detriment. The prices might go up or 
down, and the harvested quantities might increase or decrease. But as 
far as discounting is concerned, it does not matter that uncertainty cuts 
both ways; that events might equally turn out to be better or worse than 
expected. What concerns us is that it might turn out worse. In effect,   
we want to give more weight to the possibility that the returns will       
be lower than the expected returns. To express our concern over the 
negative possibility, we turn to expected utility theory (EU) and include 
some risk aversion. 
Risk aversion is the preference for investments which offer returns 
with smaller deviation from the mean over investments which offer 
returns with larger deviation from the mean, where the mean is the 
expected returns. For example, consider choosing between two coin-toss 
games with pay-offs as described in table 1 (assuming all games cost the 
same to play and the coin is fair). Both games are uncertain and both 
have an expected return of $50, but game B is less risky in that the 
payoffs do not diverge as far from the expected return as they do in 
game A. 
 
Table 1 
 Heads (Pr=0.5) Tails (Pr=0.5) Expected returns 
Game A $100×0.5 = $50 0×0.5 = 0 $50+$0 = $50 
Game B $60×0.5 = $30 $40×0.5 = 20 $30+$20 = $50 
 
The worst case scenario of game B is that the player wins $40, which 
is $10 less than the expected return, whereas the worst case scenario   
of game A is that the player wins nothing, which is $50 less than the 
expected return. A risk-averse individual would prefer to play game B   
to game A. Such an individual would value game B more highly than 
game A, and would be willing to pay a premium to play game B. This 
premium, the risk premium, varies according to the situation and the 
decision maker’s risk aversion utility of wealth function. An individual’s 
utility of wealth function tells us how much good (broadly construed) an 
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individual derives from a given return. Using a text-book risk-averse 
utility of wealth function such as U(W)= W for the above coin bet,       
we get the following risk-averse table: 
 
Table 2 
 Head (Pr=0.5) Tail (Pr=0.5) EU 
Game A U=  $100 ×0.5 = 5 U=  $0 ×0.5 = 0 5 
Game B U=  $60 ×0.5 = 3.872 U= $40×0.5 = 3.162 7.034 
 
While both games have the same expected return, for risk-averse 
individuals, the riskiness of game A reduces its utility compared to 
game B. In order to perform a CBA on this game, we turn the expected 
utility back in monetary value by calculating the risk-free (or certainty) 
equivalent of the expected utility. This is done by converting the utility 
back into dollar values using the reverse of the utility of wealth 
function, in our case risk-free equivalent (W)=U2. In the coin-toss games 
above, the risk-free equivalent of game B’s payoff is $49.47, and game 
A’s risk-free equivalent payoff is $25. In other words, an individual 
exhibiting the risk-averse utility of wealth function U(W)= W would 
derive the same amount of utility out game B as she would out of           
a guaranteed $49.47, and should be indifferent between game B and a 
guaranteed $49.47. Given that game B has an expected monetary value 
of $50 and the agent is indifferent between game B and $49.47, the risk 
premium she is willing to pay in this instance is $0.53 ($50 - $49.47).  
While different degrees and structures of risk aversion can be 
represented by altering the utility of wealth function, all of them result 
in a certainty equivalent amount smaller than the expected monetary 
value. Moreover, for the same expected value the greater the uncertainty 
of the returns in terms of variance, the lower the expected utility of the 
investment. This decrease in utility leads to a decrease in the risk-free 
equivalent value of the return, and the more the risk-free equivalent 
decreases, the greater the risk premium becomes. If uncertainty 
increases over time, then the risk premium a risk-averse individual       
is willing to pay also increases over time. This increase in the risk 
premium over time leads to progressively decreasing the value of future 
returns over time. It is this progressive decrease in the value of future 
returns that discounting for uncertainty is supposed to represent.  
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2. DISCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY: THE TECHNICAL PROBLEM 
Recall the forestry example above. I know what I get if I harvest the 
wood now, but much can happen in five years (for better or for worse). 
The longer I delay my harvesting, the greater the possibility of deviation 
from my expected return. Being risk-averse, I would be willing to pay a 
premium to guarantee my returns, and discounting the expected return 
of the harvest in five years just reflects my willingness to pay a risk 
premium. However, in this forestry example, I was solely concerned  
with the benefits or returns on my investment. But when we discount, 
we discount both costs and benefits.  
If we discount future costs and benefits because we are risk-averse, 
then the future costs demand a different treatment to the future 
benefits. This is contrary to the standard practice in CBA, where the 
discount rate is insensitive as to whether it is applied to costs or to 
benefits (Department of Finance and Administration 2006, 41). For 
example, assume that we are assessing a forestry project with expected 
returns of $20M a year and expected costs of $15M a year for the next 
ten years. The standard practice in CBA is to discount both the expected 
returns and the expected costs at the same rate before balancing them, 
or (equivalently) to first subtract the costs from the returns, and then to 
discount the result. The problem is that discounting costs with the same 
positive rate used to discount benefits in fact involves a risk-loving 
preference, not a risk-averse preference. To accurately reflect risk 
aversion, the part of the discount rate which reflects risk aversion        
in regards to future costs should be negative.  
For risk-averse individuals, discounting reflects a willingness to pay 
a premium for certainty. According to risk aversion, the more uncertain 
we are, the more we are willing to pay a premium to compensate for the 
uncertainty. And to pay a premium is to incur a cost. In the case           
of benefits, placing a cost on the returns reduces the magnitude of the 
benefits, so a positive discount rate accurately reflects our willingness 
to pay a premium. However, in the case of costs, placing a cost (for the 
premium) on existing costs increases the magnitude of the existing 
costs. This is contrary to discounting costs, which leads to a decrease in 
the magnitude of the costs.  
Consider a case where a risk-averse individual is unsure about      
the amount of a cost, say a forthcoming tax bill. Assume the tax bill 
could be $1000, $1500, or $2000, each with equal probability 1/3.       
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The expected monetary value of the forthcoming tax bill is clearly 
$1500, but a risk-averse individual who is willing to pay a premium for 
certainty would be indifferent between a tax bill T which is greater than 
$1500 but certain, and the present scenario (which has lower expected 
monetary value than T but greater variance). A risk-averse individual 
would be willing to pay T - 1500 premium for certainty, a premium 
which increases the magnitude of the costs.  
As is explained in the Office of Management and Budgets (OMB) 
Circular No A-94, “a risk-averse individual may have a certainty-
equivalent for an uncertain set of costs that is larger in magnitude than 
the mathematical expectation of costs” (OMB 1992). Yet, the standard 
use of a positive discount rate leads to a decrease in the value of the 
costs. If we were to discount the expected return of -$1500 for one year, 
at say 7%, the NPV would be -$1400. If we want to reflect an agent’s 
willingness to pay a premium for risk aversion in regards to costs,       
we should include a negative rate in the agent’s discount rate. 
The fact that uncertainty leads to a different treatment of costs and 
benefits opens a veritable can of worms. There are four issues I will 
consider in the following subsections, namely: 
 
1) Is risk aversion the right description of why we discount for 
uncertainty?  
 
2) If costs and benefits require different treatment, should we start 
by discounting them separately, and then subtracting the costs from 
the benefits, or should we first subtract the costs from the benefits, 
and then discount the result accordingly?  
 
3) Do all motivations for discounting lead to costs and benefits 
requiring different discounting rates, or is this unique to discounting 
for uncertainty? 
 
4) Does uncertainty always lead to different discount rates for costs 
and benefits? 
 
My answers will be that 1) risk aversion may not be descriptively 
accurate of empirical evidence regarding individual choices under 
uncertainty, but trying to be descriptively accurate does not help, 2) we 
should start by discounting the costs and benefits, and then balancing 
them out, 3) the need for different discount rates for costs and benefits 
is unique to uncertainty, and 4) uncertainty does not always lead to 
different rates for costs and benefits, but even in the cases where we 
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could use the same rate for both costs and benefits, we ought to reject 
uncertainty as a motivation for discounting on pragmatic grounds.  
 
Is risk aversion the right description of why uncertainty leads to 
discounting? 
Having a uniform risk-averse value function for both costs and benefits 
requires that we use a different discount rate for each, which is contrary 
to standard practice. In order to rectify this problem, two options are 
open to us. On the one hand we could accept the implication of the 
above discussion and endorse a ‘two rates’ approach to discounting, 
with a lower rate for costs to reflect the negative risk-averse component. 
Alternatively, we could hold on to the one discount rate for both costs 
and benefits and argue that risk aversion fails to accurately represent 
how agents reason under uncertainty. Indeed, empirical evidence 
suggests that agents making decisions under uncertainty do not behave 
according to an expected utility model as is normally assumed in 
economics (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992, 573; Rabin and Thaler 2001, 
220). If we want discounting to accurately reflect how people behave 
when making decisions under uncertainty, we should consider the 
empirical evidence about how people make such decisions.2  
The best known evidence for how people behave when making 
decisions under uncertainty comes from Kahneman and Tversky 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 263). Participants in Kahneman and 
Tversky’s experiments were offered hypothetical choices between    
pairs of options, with different values and probabilities in each case. 
The results of the experiments showed that individuals making 
decisions under uncertainty were not only sensitive to payoffs and 
probabilities, which is what would result from adhering to expected 
utility theory, but individuals are also sensitive to other factors such as 
the direction of the payoffs. For example, one of the choices faced       
by participants was a choice between either A: $6,000, with P=0.45,      
or B: $3,000, with P=0.90. In that case, the overwhelming majority of 
participants (86%) exhibited a risk-averse attitude and preferred option 
B (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 267). When offered a negative version 
of the above pairwise choice, namely either A: -$6,000, with P=0.45, or  
B: -$3,000, with P=0.90, the overwhelming majority of participants, 92%, 
                                                 
2 Whether we do in fact want this is an interesting question, but sadly it lies outside the 
scope of this paper. 
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preferred the riskier option A (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 267; 
Loomes and Sugden 1982, 805).  
Experimental results show that participants’ utility of wealth 
function was asymmetric across gains and losses; individuals value 
uncertainty over costs differently to uncertainty over benefits, which 
could be good news for those wanting to hold on to discounting 
unaltered. If individuals making decisions under uncertainty do not 
have a uniform risk aversion for gains and losses, then we may not need 
to resort to positive discount rates for benefits and negative discount 
rates for costs. We could hold on to a uniform rate for costs and 
benefits so long as individuals making decisions under uncertainty 
displayed 1) a risk-averse attitude in regard to gains, and 2) a risk-loving 
attitude in regard to losses, and 3) an equal degree of risk aversion in 
regard to gains as the degree of risk love displayed in regard to losses. 
As it turns out, individuals making economic decisions under 
uncertainty did usually display a risk-averse attitude in regard to gains 
(all things being equal), so a positive discount rate for benefits seems 
appropriate. Moreover, the empirical evidence also shows that in regard 
to economic losses, individuals do display the risk-loving attitude which 
is required to justify a positive discount rate for costs. But while 
individuals might be risk-averse when considering gains and risk-loving 
when considering losses, the empirical evidence shows “that agents are 
more sensitive to losses than to gains, resulting in a utility function that 
is steeper for losses than for gains” (Köbberling and Wakker 2005, 120). 
This has come to be called loss-aversion (Rabin and Thaler 2001, 226). 
As Kahneman and Tversky explain:  
 
A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that 
losses loom larger than gains. The aggravation that one experiences 
in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure 
associated with gaining the same amount (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, 279). 
 
If the exhibited rate of risk aversion in regard to gains does not 
match the exhibited rate of loss aversion in regard to losses, then        
we again require a different discount rate for costs and benefits. To 
accurately reflect the empirical evidence about individuals’ risk 
preferences, we should use a positive discount rate for both gains and 
losses, but the discount rate for losses should be of a greater 
magnitude. Thus, while it is true that the standard risk-averse expected 
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utility model is an inaccurate (or at least incomplete) description of how 
agents behave under uncertainty, appealing to descriptive accuracy 
would not help justify the present standard practice of using the same 
positive discount rate for both costs and benefits. Moreover, even if 
using the same positive discount rate for both costs and benefits was 
descriptively accurate, it does not follow that it is ethically defensible.3 
 
Should we start by discounting costs and benefits separately, and then 
balancing them, or should we first balance the costs and benefits, and 
then discount the result?  
One advantage of using the same discount rate for both costs and 
benefits is that it simplifies the process of CBA by making it insensitive 
to the order in which we proceed. It makes no difference whether we 
balance the costs and benefit first and then discount, or whether         
we discount first, and then balance the costs and benefits. However the 
introduction of different discount rates for costs and benefits 
complicates this. Now, the order in which we proceed does make a 
difference. Recall the above forestry example with expected returns      
of $20M, and expected costs of $15M. If we first balance the costs and 
benefits, and then discount the result at 5% for one year, we have a NPV 
of $4.75M. If, on the other hand, we first discount the benefits and the 
costs at 5% and -5% respectively, and then balance them, we get a NPV of 
$3.25M. Clearly, it cannot be the case that both these methods are right. 
Either we first balance the costs and benefits, and then discount, or we 
discount the costs and benefits first, and then balance them. 
I argue that if we want to discount for uncertainty we must first 
discount all costs and benefits separately, and then balance them out. 
Ordering the process the other way around by first balancing and then 
discounting is untenable; here is why. Let us assume for a moment that 
we do in fact balance the costs and benefits first and discount second. 
The balancing of the costs and benefits merges the two figures into 
single number: the balance. Presumably, if the balance is positive it 
means we anticipate a profit or benefit, so we discount the result with   
a positive discount rate. And if the balance is negative, we discount it 
with a negative discount rate because we anticipate a loss or cost from 
our project. Yet this can only be reasonable if the costs and benefits 
occur at approximately the same time. If costs and benefits occur at 
different times, the ‘balance first’ option becomes problematic.  
                                                 
3 I will consider this ethical problem in section 3, below. 
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Again consider the forestry example above, but with the following 
variations: a) all costs occur in 6 months from now, and all benefits 
occur in 1 year, b) all benefits occur in 6 months from now, and all costs 
occur in 1 year. If we first balance out the costs and benefits and      
then discount them, these work out the same. If, on the other hand,    
we begin by discounting the costs and benefits, and then balance them 
(at -5% and 5% respectively), option a) has a NPV of $3.65M, while option 
b) has a NPV of $3.75M. This may not be a great difference, but nor is it 
negligible, and it is a difference which is lost if we balance out the costs 
and benefits before we discount them.  
While the question of how often we should discount (every year, 
every six month, every quarter) is a vexing issue for discounting even if 
we use the same discount rate for both costs and benefits (OMB 1992), 
the inclusion of different discount rates for costs and benefits make  
this issue even more vexing. Discounting the costs and benefits first 
(with their respective discount rate) before balancing them out has the 
great advantage of not being susceptible to this problem. Since costs 
and benefits are discounted independently, we can accurately reflect the 
time at which the costs or benefits occur. 
 
Do all reasons for discounting lead to different discounting rates for 
costs and benefits, or is this unique to uncertainty? 
While uncertainty requires that we treat costs and benefits differently, 
other motivations for discounting do not raise the same demands. The 
reason why uncertainty is unique in requiring a positive discount rate 
for benefits and a negative rate for costs is that uncertainty is the only 
reason for discounting which leads to a preference for both costs and 
benefits to be as close to the present as possible. Whether we appeal to 
opportunity costs, economic growth or pure time preference 
(impatience) as justifications for discounting, all of these lead us to 
prefer benefits as early as possible and costs as delayed possible.       
Put simply, in all cases other than uncertainty, we have a preference for 
early returns over delayed returns. Benefits are returns, so we prefer 
them as early as possible; costs on the other hand, are the opposite of 
returns, and hence are preferred as late as possible. 
As an example consider opportunity costs as a motivation for 
discounting. Opportunity costs lead us to discount costs and benefits 
because of the financial returns we could have had if we had invested 
the resources under consideration (Torgerson and Raftery 1999, 914). 
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Recall the forestry example above with $20M returns and $15M costs. 
Assuming I could get 5% p.a. return on an investment, if I had the $20M 
benefits now, by next year that would be worth $21M. Conversely, all      
I need to have today to generate $20M next year at 5% is $19M—namely 
the discounted or NPV of the $20M, so the sooner the returns, the 
better. As for the costs, the process is reversed; the later the costs      
the better. If I had to pay the costs today, I would have to pay $15M. 
However, if I do not have to pay the $15M till next year, then I can invest 
the $15M such that by next year, I have $15.75M. And if I do not have to 
pay the $15M till next year, but I can get 5% return on my investment, all 
I need to invest today to generate $15M for next year is $14.3M—again 
the discounted or NPV of the $15M.  
With opportunity costs, the nearer (temporally) the benefits are, the 
better off I am, hence the positive discount rate. And with the costs,   
the further in the future the costs are, the better off I am, which again 
requires a positive discount rate. As stated above, all motivations for 
discounting other than uncertainty behave like opportunity costs. They 
all lead us to prefer benefits to be in the near future and costs to be as 
far into the future as possible. This set of opposing preferences justifies 
a positive discount rate for both costs and benefits. Uncertainty over 
returns, on the other hand, leads to parallel preference across costs and 
benefits. The more certain a cost or benefit is, the more desirable it is; 
the earlier a cost or benefit is, the more certain it is; therefore both costs 
and benefits are preferred as early as possible.  
 
Does discounting for uncertainty always lead to different rates for 
costs and benefits? 
So far I have proceeded under the (unstated) assumption that the 
reasons for the uncertainty over the costs and benefits were 
independent of each other. Now let us consider what happens if costs 
and benefits are correlated. Recall one more time the forestry project 
with expected returns of $20M and expected costs of $15M. Let us 
assume that there are only two uncertain variables: 1) how much timber 
will be sold—these are the benefits—and 2) how many new seedlings 
will be required—which are the costs. Let us further assume that trees 
are only felled to fill the timber orders and seedlings are only bought   
to replace felled trees. In this example, the costs and benefits are 
correlated; if we sell more timber than expected (and hence have            
a greater turnover than expected), we will need to fell more trees than 
MEDVECKY / VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1, SPRING 2012 14 
expected. If we fell more trees than expected, we will need to buy more 
seedlings to replace those trees (and hence have a greater cost than 
expected). Conversely, if we sell less timber than expected (and hence 
fell fewer trees than expected) we will need to buy fewer seedlings (and 
hence have a lower cost than expected). 
In such a case, using different discount rates for costs and benefits 
seems unreasonable because any increase or decrease in benefits 
relative to the expected benefits will be mirrored by a proportionally 
equivalent change in the costs. Therefore, it cannot be that we will have 
lower than expected benefits and higher than expected costs. In cases 
where the uncertainty over the costs and benefits exactly correlates 
(when the uncertainty in regard to cost equals the uncertainty in regard 
to benefits), it seems reasonable to use the same discount rate for both. 
When the uncertainty in regard to cost does not exactly correlate with 
the uncertainty in regard to benefit, we are no longer justified in using 
the same rate for both (for the reasons given at the beginning of this 
section). However, I will argue that even in such cases where costs and 
benefits exactly correlate, we have good pragmatic reasons to reject 
discounting for uncertainty. 
 
Correlated costs and benefits 
In cases where costs and benefits are exactly correlated we are 
permitted to use the same discount rate for both costs and benefits.  
But in such cases we are faced with a new decision in regards to the 
discounting for uncertainty, namely: what form of risk aversion should 
our discount rate reflect? The discount rate could reflect an aversion 
towards uncertainty in regards to benefits or an aversion towards 
uncertainty in regards to costs. Put differently, we could use a positive 
or a negative discount rate to account for uncertainty. While the 
standard practice in CBA is to use a positive discount rate, this does not 
need to be the case. 
I will refer to a preference for certainty in regards to benefits over a 
preference for certainty in regards to costs simply as risk aversion.    
Loss aversion will be used to denote a preference for certainty in regards 
to costs over a preference for certainty in regards to benefits. Recall that 
all we require when costs and benefits are correlated is that we use the 
same rate across both costs and benefits. We can use a positive discount 
rate, a negative discount rate, or a zero discount rate depending on 
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whether we want to reflect risk aversion, loss aversion, or no preference 
either way.  
Consider a ‘break-even’ environmental programme with correlated 
expected costs and benefits of $4 billions each. Using a positive rate to 
discount for uncertainty would reflect risk aversion; the thought would 
be something like “we might not get the benefits we expect, so we better 
under value our returns and let the costs follow suit”. We could use a 
negative rate to discount for uncertainty, which would reflect loss 
aversion; the reasoning would be “we may have higher costs than we 
expect, so we better over value our costs and let the benefits follow 
suit”. Alternatively, we may choose to use a zero discount rate, and not 
discount at all: “costs and benefits might not be what we expect them to 
be, but they will move together, so we may as well be neutral towards 
risk”. All we required to be economically consistent is that the discount 
rate be the same across costs and benefits, whether it be positive, 
negative, or neutral. I will argue that while we have no economic reasons 
to sway one way or the other, we have pragmatic reasons to use a zero 
discount rate for uncertainty.  
Consider what the consequences might be of applying each of these 
attitudes to risk in CBA to see whether this can help guide our decision. 
In many and possibly most cases—when costs and benefits are not 
correlated—discounting for uncertainty is a technical minefield. Until we 
either revise our theory of discounting (allow for two rates—one for 
costs and one for benefits—and work through the effects of this 
revision) or revise our theory of risk aversion (and revise it in such         
a way that would warrant a uniform discount rate), we ought not to 
include a rate for uncertainty in our discount rate. I will argue that     
not including a rate for uncertainty in the discount rate is the best 
option in all cases, as it is the only rate that reconciles cases when costs 
and benefits are not correlated with cases when they are correlated. 
Most projects involve many economic measures, all of which are     
to be discounted. In order to remain consistent throughout a project, 
one needs to use the same discount rate for all measures. But this can 
only be justified if all of the measures in the project are correlated. 
Furthermore, projects often interact with other projects. Often, one 
project relies on the data and outcomes of previous project, making 
uniformity a desirable attribute of the discount rate. Consider a   
project, P, in which all the internal costs and benefits are correlated.  
The inclusion of some non risk-neutral discount rate in the assessment 
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of P rules out including the outcomes of P into any project which has 
costs and benefits that are not correlated with P. This gives us a reason 
to reject both risk aversion and loss aversion, at least on some 
occasions. Given that we have no reason to endorse either risk aversion 
or loss aversion over risk neutrality, but that we sometimes have 
reasons to reject both risk aversion and loss aversion, risk neutrality 
stands as the consistently least troublesome contender, including the 
cases where costs and benefits are correlated.  
In this section, I have shown that in order to correctly reflect risk 
aversion and the willingness of risk-averse agents to pay a risk premium 
in the discount rate, the part of the discount rate which represents    
risk aversion should be positive when discounting benefits, but negative 
when discounting costs. The current practice, however, is to use the 
same, usually positive rate to account for risk aversion in the discount 
rate for both costs and benefits. I have argued that we should therefore 
be risk-neutral and not include a rate for risk aversion in the discount 
rate. Proponents of discounting for uncertainty might counter that this 
is an unnecessarily rash move and that we should just use different 
rates for costs and benefits to correctly reflect risk premiums. But, aside 
from the technical difficulties using different rates would create,            
I believe there is also an ethical problem with discounting for 
uncertainty in inter-generational social decisions. 
 
3. DISCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY: THE ETHICAL PROBLEM  
One important difference between individual and social choices is that 
with individual decisions, decision theorists are only concerned with the 
demands of rationality. In social decisions, however, decision theorists 
also have to consider “the relationship between the demands of 
rationality and those of justice or fairness” (Resnik 1987, 177).4 While     
I will not consider the various definitions of “justice” and “fairness”,       
I will argue that discounting for uncertainty runs contrary to our 
intuitions of what is just or fair under almost any definition of these 
terms (Marglin’s view aside).5  
                                                 
4 This is not to say that there are no ethical considerations to individual decisions; 
rather, the suggestion is that individual decision theory does not take into account 
notions of justice or other ethical considerations. Social decision making does. 
5 Marglin has famously (or infamously) argued that “I want the government’s social 
welfare function to reflect only the preferences of present individuals. Whatever else 
democratic theory may or may not imply, I consider it axiomatic that a democratic 
government reflects only the preferences of the individuals who are presently 
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Standard CBA discounts for uncertainty under the assumption that 
individuals prefer more certain returns to less certain returns and     
that this preference justifies decreasing the value of less certain returns 
relative to more certain returns. While I will accept these assumptions,   
I believe this is a poor justification for discounting in long-term social 
decisions. A central factor of the ethical dimension of inter-generational 
decisions is the discontinuity between decision makers and those that 
will be affected by the decision. It is this discontinuity which leads me 
to reject discounting for uncertainty in long-term decisions.  
Discounting for uncertainty is simply a form of risk aversion and 
can be compared to single-time period decisions with different 
probability distribution, as I will do below. Indeed, comparing risk 
aversion in inter-temporal decisions as is the case in discounting          
to single-time period decisions is a fruitful approach as it shows 
explicitly what we are doing (Parfit 1983, 33).  
One problem with uncertainty as a justification for discounting       
in long term social decisions is that this justification is founded on 
individual choice theory, and this translates poorly into a justification 
for inter-generational social decisions. With regard to individual choices, 
the argument is that individuals have certain attitudes to risk, and this 
attitude justifies their preferences. The standard microeconomic 
explanation of discounting is a representation of an individual’s degree 
of risk aversion in regard to her returns; whether I prefer A with 
probability distribution D or A with probability distribution D’, where D’ 
has the same expected value as D, but greater deviation from the mean 
than D. This justification relies on a form of individualism based on an 
agent’s right to chooses how to spread her own consumption over her 
own lifetime.  
However, an inter-generational social decision involves a preference 
over uncertainty and across persons; whether I prefer A with probability 
distribution D for me or A with probability distribution D’ for some 
future individual, again where D’ has the same expected value as D, but 
greater deviation from the mean than D. The discontinuity between 
decision makers and those that will be affected by the decision is 
reflected in the fact that discounting in inter-generational choices also 
involves preferences across persons. It is this dimension of discounting 
                                                                                                                                               
members of the body politic” (Marglin 1963, 97). Almost all other economists and 
philosophers believe that social distribution decisions should extend further than 
simply reflecting the views of the electorate. For some other views, see Scanlon 1982; 
Sibley 1953; Rawls 1993; Dobson 1996; Ekeli 2005. 
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for uncertainty in inter-generational decisions which I believe is of 
concern. 
Since the temporal dimension, when A occurs, is only relevant in so 
far as it determines the probability distribution, we can replace the 
temporal dimension with a change in probability distribution (Parfit 
1983, 32). A preference for $1000 now over $1000 at some future time t 
can be represented as a preference for $1000 guaranteed over some 
gamble with an expected monetary value of $1000, for example,             
a 50/50 chance at $1500 or $500. Now if we translate this into a social 
decision and make our preference over uncertainty and across persons, 
we get a preference for $1000 guaranteed for some individual A over     
a 50/50 chance at $1500 or $500 for some other individual B. This 
already seems problematic; why should the fact that there is uncertainty 
over the value of the outcome affect who gets the outcome.  
It is worse still if we translate our decision into an inter-generational 
decision, where we make our preference over uncertainty and across 
persons, and in which we (the decision makers) are often some of the 
persons involved. We get a preference for $1000 guaranteed for some 
individuals, often ourselves, over a 50/50 chance at $1500 or $500     
for someone else, namely future generations. In the cases where we are 
some of the persons involved, we will prefer the guaranteed money     
for us to the possible money for someone else. But because we are 
considering choices which distribute goods across persons including 
ourselves, we cannot differentiate between the preference for certainty 
(which leads to discounting) and the preference for self-interest (which 
does not necessarily lead to discounting). Indeed, we will prefer money 
for us with any probability distribution (all things being equal) over 
money for someone else. This can lead us to run against our preferences 
for the more certain over the less certain. We would likely prefer            
a 50/50 chance at $1500 or $500 for us over $1000 guaranteed for 
someone else, even though there is greater variance in our preferred 
option. This is comparable to preferring future goods for us over 
present goods for someone else, which runs contrary to the theory of 
discounting.  
Our incapacity to differentiate between our preference for certainty 
and our preference for self-interest poses an ethical challenge.               
A preference for self-interest has nothing to do with uncertainty. It can, 
however, be a reason to prefer one outcome over another. We might 
prefer the present because we, the current generation, want the 
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consumption. But such an approach to social decision making seems 
irreconcilable with most conceptions of fairness and justice. Indeed, 
most philosophers and economists explicitly object to the use of such 
self-interest in social decision making (Ramsey 1928, 543; Smart 1973, 
63; Smith 1976 [1776-1789], III-2; Stern 2007, 31).  
For the majority not willing to endorse such self-interest, 
discounting for risk aversion must be distinguishable from discounting 
for self-interest. But it is not possible to distinguish between the two. 
This creates a dilemma for those wanting to discount for uncertainty 
but not for self-interest: either they must accept that self-interest might 
be “smuggled in” with uncertainty; or they must reject discounting for 
uncertainty. As I am not willing to accept self-interest as a motivation 
for discounting in social decisions, I side with those who reject 
discounting for uncertainty. 
 
Discounting as compensation 
Proponents of discounting for uncertainty might reply to my ethical 
objection by arguing that future individuals might accept the imposition 
of risk if they were to be compensated for this imposition. According to 
this line of reasoning, to impose a risk on another individual is morally 
permissible if that other individual is willing to accept the risk for an 
agreed amount of compensation. Now the issue turns not on whether  
we can discount for risk, but on what the discount rate should be, such 
that it incorporates the agreed compensation.  
While this argument might have some weight in intra-generational 
decisions, it has little traction when applied to inter-generational issues. 
The challenge this argument faces, when applied to inter-generational 
decisions, stems from our incapacity to assess what counts as 
compensation. As the individuals to be compensated (future 
generations) are not part of the decision making framework, they cannot 
state what they would accept as a just compensation, thus, there is no 
agreed upon compensation. At best, we can allow for what we believe 
would be a just compensation for the imposition of risk. But, as was 
stated previously, in many inter-generational distribution decisions, 
we—the current generation—are not only decision makers, but are also 
potential beneficiaries of the decision. This self-interest skews our 
capacity for detached and fair judgement, much as it did in regard to 
uncertainty. The ‘compensation argument’ does not solve the problem, 
it simply shifts the problem. Instead of imposing our view of acceptable 
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risks, we impose our view of acceptable compensation for acceptable 
risks. This approach, in my view, creates more problems than it solves.  
Consider uncertainty over the cost of decommissioning a nuclear 
power station. Currently the average cost of decommissioning a nuclear 
plant is around US$400M (Nuclear Energy Institute 2011). If we were to 
discount this value for risk aversion, we would reduce its magnitude 
and have a possible shortfall. According to the argument above, we 
could compensate for the risk by altering the discount rate. But I simply 
would not know how much to compensate people in 80 or 100 years 
from now for the possible shortfall they might face when dealing with 
the decommissioning of nuclear power stations. In fact, it has been 
argued that the uncertainty over issues such as nuclear power should 
lead us to be cautious about our assessment of future costs and benefits 
and, if anything, we should err on the side of over-allocation of funds, 
not under-allocation of funds (Caney 2009, 176; Gardiner 2006, 3;  
Steele 2006, 19).6  
Whichever way we go, we impose views of acceptable compensation 
for acceptable risks. While some imposition of our view of what sits as 
acceptable compensation is an inevitable part of inter-generational 
decisions, the imposition of compensation for our risk aversion is not. 
We do not need to impose our view of acceptable risks onto future 
generations, thus we do not need to impose our view of acceptable 
compensation for acceptable risks. All we need to do is remain risk-
neutral when choosing a discount rate. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the economic debate surrounding environmental decision making, 
discounting stands as one of the most controversial issues. In this 
article, I have focussed on one of the justifications for discounting, 
uncertainty. I argued that uncertainty spelled out in terms of risk 
aversion cannot justify discounting in the case of inter-generational 
social decisions. I argued that there are two reasons to reject 
discounting for uncertainty in such cases.  
Firstly, I argued that on technical grounds, discounting costs and 
benefits by the same rate inaccurately reflects risk aversion. I noted an 
exception to this case, namely when costs and benefits are correlated 
and have argued that while in such cases we have no economic reasons 
to outright reject discounting for uncertainty, we do have a pragmatic 
                                                 
6 This issue is closely related to the precautionary principle. 
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reason: that only a risk-neutral discount rate (or no discounting) can 
lead to a uniform discount rate across projects. 
Secondly, I argued that on ethical grounds, discounting for 
uncertainty relies on a form of individualism. This individualism might 
be reasonable in standard microeconomic theory, where an agent 
chooses how to spread her own consumption over her own lifetime. 
However, when applied to long-term environmental decisions, the 
discontinuity between the decision makers (the present generation)   
and those who will bear the consequences of the decision (the future 
generations) undermines the rationale for discounting for uncertainty.  
Since discounting for uncertainty is both technically and ethically 
problematic in its current form, I believe we ought to reject uncertainty 
as a justification for discounting in cases of long-term environmental 
decisions and not include a rate for uncertainty in our discount rate. 
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